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The Watchdogs of Washminster ± Parliamentary Scrutiny of 
Executive Patronage in the United Kingdom 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
The role of legislatures in scrutinising executive patronage has received scant 
attention in the context of parliamentary democracy.  This article addresses this 
lacuna by focusing on the parliamentary scrutiny of public appointments in the 
United Kingdom.  Presenting the results of an extensive programme of research, it 
reveals how select committees have accrued increasing powers to challenge 
ministerial appointments, and how this has resulted in a series of unintended 
consequences that raise critical concerns regarding the overall added-value of pre-
appointment scrutiny.  The article is therefore of comparative significance for 
theories of legislative scrutiny in particular and executive-legislature dynamics more 
broadly. 
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Executive patronage focuses on the capacity of ministers to appoint people to 
positions in public life, and has traditionally been understood as a means through 
which government actors can reward party activists, repay political debts and embed 
partisan players throughout the state infrastructure.  It is for this reason that 
H[HFXWLYH SDWURQDJH LV FRPPRQO\ DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK µWKH FRORQLDOL]DWLRQ RI WKH VWDWH¶
(Müller, 2006); and until very recently executive patronage was often imbued with the 
assumption that µSDWURQDJH LV HYLO¶ %HDUILHOG  S   Yet, within a densely 
populated and increasingly fragmented governance terrain, the power to appoint 
individuals to key positions throughout the delegated state can be understood as an 
ex-ante tool of bureaucratic control: a risk reduction mechanism that enables 
ministers to appoint those in whom they have confidence due to personal, party or 
ideological affiliations.  As such, the normative assumptions of earlier scholarship 
have been challenged by an emerging ERG\RIµUHYLVLRQLVW¶VFKRODUVKLSWKDWHPSKDVLVHV
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a shift in the political deployment of patronage from a tool of corruption towards a 
tool of governance in large parts of the world (e.g. Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014; Kopecký, 
Mair and Spirova, 2012; Kopecký and Scherlis, 2008; Park and Kim, 2013).   
 
 
It is within this broader intellectual canvas that this article focuses on a topic largely 
neglected by existing research: the role of parliamentary legislatures in scrutinising 
and controlling executive patronage.  This lack of research reflects that fact that 
parliaments have (historically and comparatively) rarely enjoyed powers over 
executive patronage.  7KH2(&'¶VUHSRUW LQWR µ'LVWULEXWHG3XEOLF*RYHUQDQFH¶
FRQFOXGHG WKDW SDUOLDPHQWV JHQHUDOO\ UHPDLQHG µWKH JUHDW RXWVLGHU¶ DQG DOWKRXJK
exceptions exist ± the provincial legislatures of Ontario and Nova Scotia in Canada 
have been granted formal opportunities to scrutinise ministerial appointments ±  pre-
appointment hearings have often been little more than rubber-stamping exercises 
(Pond, 2008a, 2008b).  Against this comparative backdrop, the United Kingdom (UK) 
QRZVWDQGVLQDXQLTXHSRVLWLRQLQUHODWLRQWRLWVSDUOLDPHQW¶VUHODWLYHVWUHQJWKRYHU
executive patronage.  Since 2007, the House of Commons ± via its select committees 
± has been granted formal powers to scrutinise a growing portfolio of ministerial 
appointments, and even to veto appointments a number of high-profile positions; and 
since 2007, select committees have been keen to exercise their newly-granted powers, 
holding a total of 75 pre-appointment hearings with 81 candidates.   Moreover, select 
committees members from all parties have become increasingly willing to challenge 
PLQLVWHUV¶ GHFLVLRQV UHVXOWLQJ LQ D EXUJHRQLQJ QXPEHU RI UHMHFWLRQV Dnd divisions 
since October 2009.  
 
 
In is in this context that this article highlights a series of critical, and comparatively 
relevant, empirical findings.  Since 2007, select committees have emerged as 
influential actors ± even gatekeepers ± in the public appointments process, resulting 
in  a recalibration of the balance of power between government and Parliament.  Yet, 
rather than axiomatically enhancing transparency and accountability, the engagement 
of select committees has led to a range of unintended consequences.  This article 
UHYHDOV WKH HPHUJHQFH RI  µVFUXWLQ\ FUHHS¶ DV VHOHFW FRPPLWWHHV KDYH VRXJKW WKH
expansion of their competencies, which has added an additional layer of complexity to 
an already congested regulatory landscape.  Moreover, as select committees become 
increasingly active in challenging the decisions of ministers, there have been 
incidences of aggression as select committees have neglected a focus on the 
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professional competency of a candidate in favour of crude political point-scoring.  In 
effectively re-politicising an otherwise independently regulated appointments process, 
there is also evidence that the introduction of pre-appointment hearings has had a 
deterrent effect, discouraging participation in public life.  Together, such issues raise 
fundamental questions regarding the capacity of select committees to discharge these 
functions responsibly and the overall added-value offered by pre-appointment 
scrutiny.   
 
 
<HW GHVSLWH VXFK LPSOLFDWLRQV WKH XQIROGLQJ RI WKH 8.¶V H[SHULPHQW with pre-
appointment scrutiny has been largely neglected by commentators and scholars.  The 
only other study is a short evaluation report commissioned by the House of Commons 
that examined the first 20 hearings held between 2007-2010 (HC 1230, 2011; later 
VXPPDULVHG LQ+D]HOO HWDOZKLFK WHQWDWLYHO\FRQFOXGHG WKDW µdespite lacking 
formal powers of veto, Westminster select committees do now have the capacity to 
LQIOXHQFH DFWRUV LQYROYHG LQ WKHSXEOLF DSSRLQWPHQWV SURFHVV¶ +D]HOO HW DO S
237).  However, this research neglects the critical, more assertive phase of select 
committee activism that has emerged since October 2009, gathering pace under the 
Coalition Government since 2010.  As a result, the extensive research presented here, 
which covers 1997-2014, builds on these nascent conclusions and provides clear, 
unequivocal evidence of the (re-)politicisation of executive patronage.  This article 
presents the results of a three-year research programme entailing the analysis of 
select committee reports and minutes of evidence for all 75 pre-appointment hearings 
(plus an additional 27 sets of reports relating to all post-appointment hearings held by 
the Treasury Select Committee), along with all government responses.  The results of 
this analysis were interrogated in more detail through a programme of 56 interviews 
with ministers, senior officials, parliamentarians, appointees and recruitment 
specialists.  These findings were then subjected to further reflection and review 
through engagement with two select committee inquiries.   
 
 
In order to set out these findings and explore their implications for the exercise of 
executive patronage, this article is divided into four sections. As this introduction has 
suggested, in the context of delegation, the capacity to appoint appropriately skilled 
and politically attuned allies to key roles within public bodies  constitutes a important 
channel of control.  The first section therefore unpacks the logic of delegation and 
accountability within a parliamentary framework, drawing on analytical heuristics 
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developed within the principal-agent literature to consider the underlying rationale of 
pre-appointment scrutiny and the appropriateness of the tools adopted.  Building on 
this, the second section provides the historical foundations of pre-appointment 
scrutiny, delineating the pressures that conspired to encourage successive 
governments to reform patterns of executive patronage in ways ostensibly at odds 
with the governing norms of parliamentary politics.   The third and most substantive 
VHFWLRQ WKHQ FKDUWV WKH LPSDFW RI WKH 8.¶V H[SHULHQFH RI SUH-appointment scrutiny, 
specifically focusing on the five ± largely unintended ± consequences of activism, 
aggression, (re-)politicisiation, deterrance and added-value. The final section then 
teases out the key lessons revealed by this research, placing the findings of this article 
within the contours of wider comparative and theoretical debates.  
 
 
1. Principals, patronage and parliamentary democracy 
 
A misconception exists that the choice between a merit-based and patronage-based 
EXUHDXFUDF\FRQVWLWXWHVDµIXQGDPHQWDOGLFKRWRP\¶/DXSHQWHDQG1LVWRWVND\D
p. 436; see also Grindle, 2012, p. 31).  In the context of delegation, executive 
patronage can constitute a risk-reduction mechanism through which low-cost, high-
trust relationships can be manufactured and sustained.  From this perspective, 
executive patronage can instead be understood as a critical link in the chain of 
delegation that extends from voters to those charged with policy implementation 
(Müller, 2000).  Such arguments have been developed in recent scholarship that has 
focused on the way in which governments throughout the world have maximised their 
patronage capacities to assert control over the delegated semi-state (e.g. Kopecky, 
Mair and Spirova, 2012; Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014), which in turn underlines a crucial 
GLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQµSDWURQDJHDVFRUUXSWLRQ¶DQGµSDWURQDJHDVJRYHUQDQFH¶)OLQGHUV
and Matthews, 2010).  However, whilst such studies have focused on the potential for 
executive control offered by patronage, none have focused on what might be termed 
µSDUOLDPHQWDU\UHJXODWLRQ¶ 
 
Whilst unexplored in the context of parliamentary democracy, a number of scholars 
have analysed legislative oversight of executive patronage in the context of 
presidentialism.  In the US, the findings of the independent review of the 
appointments process (Twentieth Century Fund, 1996) were reiterated by several 
scholars, including Aberbach and Rockman (2009), who found that the complexity of 
the appointments process, the activism of Congress, and the political polarisation 
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that often occurs across the separate branches of government had served to congest 
the system and encourage executive gaming.  Moreover, this literature suggests that 
the potential of patronage as a tool of governance is threatened by excessive 
regulation and acerbic scrutiny.  Congressional committees have a longstanding 
reputation for questioning that can be intrusive, embarrassing and sometimes 
irreleYDQWWRWKHDSSRLQWHH¶VVXLWDELOLW\IRUDVSHFLILFSRVWDQGZKLOVWRYHUSHUFHQW
of presidential appointments receive Senate approval (Bell, 2002, p. 590), research 
indicates that many candidates simply drop out of the process before being formally 
rejected (Aberbach and Rockman, 2009, p. 45).  The way in which legislative scrutiny 
risks politicising key public appointments by drawing executives and legislatures into 
bitter ± and highly public ± conflict was vividly illustrated by the withdrawal of 
former US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers from the race to become the next head 
of the US Federal Reserve.  In his explanatory letter to President Obama, the 
IDYRXULWHWRVXFFHHG%HQ%HUQDQNHH[SODLQHG µ,KDYHUHOXFWDQWO\FRQFOXGHGWKDWDQ\
possible confirmation process for me would be acrimonious and would not serve the 
interests of the Federal Reserve, the administration or ultimately the interests of the 
QDWLRQ¶V RQJRLQJ HFRQRPLF UHFRYHU\¶  As such, a decisive reaction against the 
congested and politicised appointments process has begun to emerge, reflected in 
2EDPD¶V µJRYHUQPHQW RI PDQ\ F]DUV¶ ZKLFKKDV EHHQ LQWHUSUHWHG DV DQDWWHPSWE\
the President to recapture control by circumventing the machinery of congressional 
scrutiny in order to place trusted allies in key administrative positions (Saiger, 2011).   
 
 
It is therefore clear that the appropriate trade-off between legislative scrutiny and 
executive patronage is highly contested in the context of presidential systems such as 
the US; and to explain the dilemmas in which this results, several scholars have 
sought to derive insights from principal-agent theory (PAT).  In essence, PAT focuses 
on the challenges of agency performance, control and accountability that arise from 
the delegation of functions from an elected political principal to an unelected 
bureaucratic agent.  Such problems include ± inter alia ± µRPLVVLRQ¶DQDJHQWVLPSO\
IDLOV WRDFW LQ LWVSULQFLSDO¶VEHVW LQWHUHVWVRUHYHQ µFRPPLVVLRQ¶ DQDJHQW IROORZVD
course of action contrary to the SULQFLSDO¶V EHVW LQWHUHVWV SUREOHPV OLNHO\ WR EH
H[DFHUEDWHGE\µKLGGHQLQIRUPDWLRQ¶DSULQFLSDOGRHVQRWKDYHIXOONQRZOHGJHRIWKH
WDVN RU WKH DJHQW RU µKLGGHQ DFWLRQ¶ D SULQFLSDO FDQQRW IXOO\ REVHUYH WKH DJHQW¶V
actions).  In turn, hidden informatLRQFDQJLYHULVHWRSUREOHPVRIµDGYHUVHVHOHFWLRQ¶
whereby principals select agents without appropriate skills or preferences; and hidden 
DFWLRQFDQUHVXOW LQ µPRUDOKD]DUG¶ZKHUHE\DJHQWVWKDWDUHVHOHFWHGKDYHLQFHQWLYHV
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and opportunities to take unoEVHUYDEOH DFWLRQ WKDW UXQV FRXQWHU WR WKHLU SULQFLSDO¶V
interests (Strøm, 2000, pp. 270-1). 
 
 
Accordingly, scholars have applied the lens of PAT to shed light on the ways in which 
elected political principals exert control over their unelected bureaucratic agents in 
order to address the agency problems outlined above.  As Lupia and McCubbins 
observe, µLQRUGHUWRDYRLGWKHSLWIDOOVRIGHOHJDWLRQWKHSULQFLSDOPXVWHLWKHUSLFND
JRRGDJHQWRUOHDUQHQRXJKWRSURWHFWKHULQWHUHVWV¶/XSLDDQG0F&XEELQV4, p. 
364).  A range of measures are available to principals, including ex ante mechanisms 
to contain agency losses before entering into an agreement (e.g. contract design, 
screening and selection); and ex post tools to minimise agency losses after an 
agreement has been made (e.g. monitoring, reporting and institutional checks).    
:KLOVW VXFK WRROV DUH QRW PXWXDOO\ H[FOXVLYH DV µ>U@HSUHVHQWDWLYH GHPRFUDF\ FOHDUO\
entails problems of adverse selection as well aVPRUDOKD]DUG¶WKHLUVHOHFWLRQVKRXOG
be informed by the nature of agency problem that requires redress (Strøm, 2000, p. 
272).  Reflecting on such distinctions, it is apparent that executive patronage 
constitutes a critical ex-ante mechanism to minimise the agency losses associated 
with delegation, as the appointment of appropriately skilled and politically attuned 
µDOOLHV¶ (SVWHLQDQG2¶+DOORUDQ +XEHUDQG6KLSDQ WRNH\UROHVDFURVV
the bureaucracy mitigates the risks associated with adverse selection.  In turn, the 
ongoing presence of such allies ameliorates the likelihood of moral hazard.   The 
capacity of executive patronage to address such agency issues would therefore 
anticipate that governments would remain resistant to reforms intended to fetter or 
reduce patronage capacities.   
 
 
Moreover, in the context of parliamentary democracy specifically, it is counter-
intuitive that ministers would seek to cede powers through the creation of alternative 
± even competing ± lines of accountability to which the introduction of pre-
appointment scrutiny give rise.  In contrast to the non-linear chains of delegation and 
multiple institutional checks arising from the separation of powers within 
presidential systems, parliamentary systems are characterised by a line of delegation 
that runs from voters through to officials in governments departments and their 
agencies, which is mirrored by a corresponding chain of accountability running in the 
reverse direction.  In turn, whereas agents in presidential systems may be 
accountable to multiple principals, agents in parliamentary systems are accountable 
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to either single or non-competing principals, which further reduces the reliance on 
the institutional checks (Strøm, 2000, pp. 266-73).  Moreover, within majoritarian 
Westminster systems such as the UK, the legislature is not intended, expected or 
resourced to play a proactive role in the administration of the state.  Reflecting on 
these constitutional distinctions, scholars have underlined the limited capacity of 
legislatures in parliamentary systems to scrutinise the actions of bureaucratic agents, 
and the weaknesses of the tools available to them.  Strøm, for example, argues that 
parliamentary legislatures µGRQRWKDYHPRQLWRULQJFDSDFLW\QHFHVVDU\ WRGHWHUPLQH
ZKHQVXFKVDQFWLRQVPLJKWEHDSSURSULDWH¶DQGWKDWVFUXWLQ\PHFKDQLVPVµPXFKOHVV
prominent, and have much less WHHWK¶6SHFLILFDOO\SDUOLDPHQWDU\FRPPLWWHHVµKDYH
much lower oversight capacity, and in the classical Westminster model, this capacity 
LVDOPRVWHQWLUHO\DEVHQW¶ 6WU¡PSVHHDOVR+XEHUDQG6KLSDQ 2000).   
Against this broader backdrop, both the abdication by ministers of their patronage 
capacity and the empowerment of the House of Commons to scrutinise public 
appointments appears incongruent and demands further analysis.   
 
 
2. Parliamentary oversight and scrutiny creep 
 
Despite its traditional reputation as a paradigm of power-hoarding majoritarianism, 
cross-European comparative analysis reveals the patronage capacities of British 
government ministers to be the lowest within those parliamentary systems studied 
(Kopecký, Mair and Spirova, 2012).  This has been underlined by a handful of recent 
studies on ministerial appointments in the UK, which have focused on the impact of 
WKHULVHRI LQGHSHQGHQWUHJXODWRU\DSSRLQWPHQWFRPPLVVLRQVLQ WHUPVRI µVKULQNLQJ
UHDFK DQG GLOXWHG SHUPHDWLRQ¶ HJ. McTavish and Pyper, 2007; Flinders and 
Matthews, 2010).  In particular, the establishment of OCPA constituted a critical 
juncture from the unfettered capacity of ministers to make appointments to an 
increasingly constrained selectivity focused solely on merit.  Moreover, since 1995, 
WKHUHJXODWLRQRIPLQLVWHULDOSDWURQDJHKDVH[SDQGHGDQGGHHSHQHGDV2&3$¶V&RGH
has gradually extended to encompass a wider range of appointments (and latterly re-
appointments).  The creation of OCPA also paved the way for a plethora of additional 
independent appointments commissions ± such as the NHS Appointments 
Commission1 and the Judicial Appointments Commission ± whereby the 
plenipotentiary patronage powers of ministers were fully rescinded away from 
ministers.  Yet at the same time that successive governments were actively seeking to 
                                                        
1 Abolished by the Coalition Government as part of its public bodies reform programme in October 2012. 
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depoliticise the public appointments process through the transfer of key 
competencies to this range of independent regulators, calls for an additional layer of 
µSDUOLDPHQWDU\ UHJXODWLRQ¶ PRXQWHG  7KLV VHFWLRQ WKHUHIRUH sets out the pressures 
that encouraged reforms ostensibly at odds with the governing norms of 
parliamentary politics.  Specifically, it identifies on two distinct phases of activity. 
The first phase covers 1997-2009, during which select committees pressed for 
additional scrutiny capacities, and sought to demonstrate the responsible execution 
of their duties; and the second phase covers 2009 onwards, a period that has 
witnessed increased parliamentary activism and heightened tensions between 
government and Parliament.  These two phases provide not simply a chronological 
account of the evolution of ministerial patronage, but a way of understanding the 
changing dynamics of executive-legislature relationships.  In particular, it underlines 
the stark shift in the behavior and attitudes of select committees during this second 
phase, and the range of unintended consequences in which this has resulted.  
 
 3KDVHµ&UDFNVDQG:HGJHV¶-2009 
 
The former MP Tony Wright once described the politics of parliamentary reform as 
EHLQJDERXW WKH LQVHUWLRQRI µFUDFNVDQGZHGJHV¶ LQWR HVWDEOLVKHd practices that over 
time could be levered to introduce more significant reforms (2004).  With regards to 
pre-appointment scrutiny, the first significant crack occurred just days after the May 
1997 general election when the Labour Government, despite pre-election pledges to 
give select committees greater powers over appointments, rejected the Treasury Select 
&RPPLWWHH¶V UHTXHVW IRU D IRUPDO UROH LQ DSSRLQWPHQWV WR WKH QHZ 0RQHWDU\ 3ROLF\
Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England (HC 282, 1997, paras. 47-9). The 
*RYHUQPHQW FLWHG µVXEVWDQWLDO GLIILFXOWLHV ZLWK WKLV SURSRVDO¶ DQG µLPSRUWDQW
FRQVWLWXWLRQDO LVVXHV ZKLFK JR IDU ZLGHU WKDQ WKH %DQN RI (QJODQG¶ (HC 502, 1998, 
paras. xiii). Undeterred, the Treasury Select Committee announced its intention to its 
own inIRUPDO V\VWHP RI µFRQILUPDWLRQ KHDULQJV¶ IRU DOO DSSRLQWPHQWV DQG UH-
DSSRLQWPHQWV WR WKH 03& ZLWK TXHVWLRQLQJ µUHVWULFWHG WR LVVXHV RI WKH DSSRLQWHH¶V
SHUVRQDO LQGHSHQGHQFH DQG SURIHVVLRQDO FRPSHWHQFH¶ +&   SDUD  DQG
held its first round of hearings in June 1998. 
 
 
7KH 7UHDVXU\ 6HOHFW &RPPLWWHH¶V H[SHULPHQW ZLWK post-appointment scrutiny was 
generally deemed successful and as evidence that MPs could be trusted to set aside 
SDUW\ SROLWLFV WR IRFXV RQ WKH SURIHVVLRQDO FRPSHWHQF\ RI WKH PLQVWHU¶s appointee.  
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This success fostered further demands by select committees to engage in the 
oversight of ministerial appointments; and in March 2000 the Liaison Committee 
recommended a formalised system of pre-appointment hearings (HC 300, 2000, 
para. 24); proposals which were supported by a number of external commissions, 
LQFOXGLQJ WKH &RQVHUYDWLYH 3DUW\¶V Commission to Strengthen Parliament and the 
+DQVDUG 6RFLHW\¶V Commission on Parliamentary Scrutiny. Yet, the Government 
rejected such demands on the basis WKDW µ>a]ny indication that a Ministerial 
appointment relied upon the approval of a select committee or was open to a select 
committee veto would break the clear lines of accountability by which Ministers are 
answerable to Committees for the actions of thH H[HFXWLYH¶  7KH *RYHUQPHQW DOVR
highlighted the risk of  µODPH GXFN¶ DSSRLQWHHV  µDSSRLQWHG E\ WKH 0LQLVWHU EXW
ZLWKRXW6HOHFW&RPPLWWHHHQGRUVHPHQW¶DQGRIWKHVFUXWLQ\SURFHVVVHUYLQJWRµGHWHU
good candidates from putting themselves forward because of the nature of the 
KHDULQJV¶(HC 748, 2000, paras. 17-19).   
 
 
The scrutiny of ministerial patronage thus became one strand of a broader debate 
concerning executive-legislature relationships. Many parliamentarians deemed the 
dominance of the executive as unsustainable, arguing that there was a need to move 
select committees from their traditionally reactive and under-resourced form of 
RYHUVLJKWWRZDUGVDPRUHSURDFWLYHDQGµV\VWHPDWLF¶PRGHO+DQVDUG6RFLHW\
A set of reforms were passed by a resolution of the House intended to shift the 
balance of power back tRZDUGVWKHOHJLVODWXUHDQGLQFOXGHGLQWKHVHWRIµ&RUH7DVNV¶
IRU VHOHFW FRPPLWWHHVZDV WKH UHTXLUHPHQW WR µVFUXWLQLVHPDMRUDSSRLQWPHQWVPDGH
E\ WKHGHSDUWPHQW¶ +& ,Q-XO\ WKH3XEOLF$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ6HOHFW
Committee (PASC) again recommended a formalised system of pre-appointment 
scrutiny (HC 165-I), but the Government remained resolute regarding its 
incompatibility with parliamentary democracy (e.g. Cm. 6056, 2003). This situation 
therefore evolved in a typically British muddled manner as select committees held ad 
hoc informal pre-DSSRLQWPHQW KHDULQJV XQGHU WKH QHZ µ&RUH 7DVNV¶ ZKLOVW WKH
Government refused to sanction their formal introduction.  
 
 
In July 2007, without any prior consultation or announcement, the situation changed 
when Gordon Brown used his first speech as Prime Minister to announce a package 
RIFRQVWLWXWLRQDOUHIRUPVLQFOXGLQJDOORZLQJ3DUOLDPHQWµDELJJHUUROHLQWKHVHOHFWLRQ
RI NH\ SXEOLF RIILFLDOV¶ Hansard, 3 July 2007, c. 816); and at the same time, the 
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Chancellor announced that in future all members of the MPC would be subject to 
formalised pre-commencement hearings in front of the Treasury Select Committee 
(Hansard, 3 July 2007, c43W).  Setting out the underpinning rationale of these 
measures, the Governance of Britain JUHHQSDSHUH[SODLQHGWKDWKHDULQJVµZRXOGEH
non-binding, but in light of the report of the committee, Ministers would decide 
ZKHWKHU WR SURFHHG¶ &P   SDUD   0RUHRYHU WKH *RYHUQPHQW DOVR
announced that the appointment of the Chair of the newly-established Statistics 
Authority would be subject to a full confirmatory vote in the House of Commons. 
Responding to these announcements, the PASC stressed the need for committees to 
mirror the behavior of the Treasury Select Committee by focusing on the 
µSURIHVVLRQDO FRPSHWHQFH¶ DQG µSHUVRQDO LQGHSHQGHQFH¶ RI FDQGLGDWH RWKHUZLVH µthe 
reputations of committees are likely to suffer and the Government is likely to 
reconsider whether pre-DSSRLQWPHQWKHDULQJVDUHDSSURSULDWH¶+&SDUD. 
34).  These principles were subsequently enshrined in the guidance produced by the 
Liaison Committee and the Cabinet Office (Cabinet Office, 2009; HC 152, 2008), and 
following a period of negotiation with the Liaison Committee, the Cabinet Office 
published in August 2009 an agreed list of 53 posts subject to pre-appointment 
hearings (Cabinet Office, 2009). 
 
 
 Phase 2: Emboldened Activism, 2009-2013 
 
As this overview illustrates, 1997-2009 marked the beginning of a transition towards 
a more formalised system of pre-appointment scrutiny, underpinned by a 
FRPPLWPHQWWRµJRRGEHKDYLRU¶E\VHOHFWFRPPLWWHHV %\KRZHYHUWKHLQLWLDO
cracks that had reshaped executive patronage had been prised open, and this period 
FDQ EH XQGHUVWRRG DV RQH RI µHPEROGHQHG DFWLYLVP¶ DV SDUOLDPHQWDULDQV VRXJKW WR
accrue further powers and demonstrate their independence from the executive.  This 
was reflected in the burgeoning number of rejections and divisions which occurred 
from October 2009 onwards (see table 2, below), several of which resulting in 
ministers being challenged by committee members from within their own parties.  
Nonetheless, despite this increased activism, from 2010 onwards the Coalition 
*RYHUQPHQWSXUVXHGLWVFRPPLWPHQWWRµVWUHQJWKHQWKHSRZHUVRIVHOHFWFommittees 
WRVFUXWLQLVHPDMRUSXEOLFDSSRLQWPHQWV¶+0*RYHUQPHQWSZKLFKKDG
the concomitant effect of further constraining the patronage capacities of ministers.   
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In September 2010 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, announced the 
VWDWXWRU\ µGRXEOH-ORFNLQJ¶ IRU DSSRLQWPHQWV WR WKH 2IILFH IRU %XGJHW 5HVSRQVLELOLW\
whereby the appointment and dismissal of senior staff could only proceed with the 
joint approval of government and parliament.  The provision within the Budget 
Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011 for statutory veto over ministerial 
appointments thus instituted a significant shift in the balance of power between 
government and Parliament.  The Coalition also allowed the non-VWDWXWRU\ µGRXEOH-
ORFNLQJ¶RIDSSRLQWPHnts in February 2011, when the Justice Minister announced that 
*RYHUQPHQW ZRXOG DFFHSW WKH -XVWLFH 6HOHFW &RPPLWWHH¶V ILQDO UHFRPPHQGDWLRQ
UHJDUGLQJ WKH PLQLVWHU¶V SUHIHUUHG FDQGLGDWH WR WKH SRVW RI ,QIRUPDWLRQ
Commissioner in order to strengthen the OfficH¶V LQGHSHQGHQFH Hansard, 16 
February 2011, cc. 87-88WS).  The Government also sanctioned hearings for 
positions not covered by Cabinet Office Guidance, for example in March 2011 
acquiescing to demands for the Chair of the BBC Trust to be subject to a pre-
appointment hearing.  In June 2011, the withdrawal of the preferred candidate for 
the Chair of the UK Statistics Authority (discussed below) prompted a further 
innovation, and for the first time the Cabinet Office granting the PASC a role in the 
earlier stages of the selection process.   Accordingly, in July 2011, the appointment 
SURFHHGHG DV D µMRLQW DSSRLQWPHQW¶ ZKHUHE\ WKH 3$6& ZDV FRQVXOWHG RQ WKH MRE
specification, its Chair sat on the selection panel; and, following a pre-appointment 
hearing, the appointment was subject to confirmatory vote by the House.  Together, 
these changes were consolidated in updated Cabinet Office guidance, published in 
2013, which provided an updated list of 52 positions subject to pre-appointment 
hearings.  As well as reflecting changes to the wider delegated state resulting from the 
&RDOLWLRQ *RYHUQPHQW¶V SXEOLF ERGLHV UHIRUP SURJUDPPH WKH UHYLVHG OLVW DOVR
included several pre-existing positions, including the Chair of the BBC Trust and 
Chair of SC4, both of which had already been subject to pre-appointment hearings 
following demands by the relevant select committees. 
 
 
Stimulated by this disparate raft of changes, this period has also witnessed select 
committees demanding extended and additional powers.  The Liaison Committee has 
EHHQSDUWLFXODUO\SURDFWLYH LQHQVXULQJ WKDW WKHYLHZVRI FRPPLWWHHVDUH µJLYHQGXH
ZHLJKW¶ LQ WKH DSSRLQWPHQWV SURFHVV +&   SDUD  SURGXFLQJ D OLVW RI
demands that would embed select committees at all stages.  Its recommendations 
have included: consultation between departments and committees on the job 
specification prior to advertisement (HC 426, 2010, para. 71); information about 
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short-listed candidates not selected (HC 1230, 2011, 3); private meetings between 
ministers and committees in cases where a committee is inclined to make a negative 
report (HC 426, 2010, para. 72); and, a confirmatory vote in the House in relation to 
key appointments (HC 1230, 2011, p. 3).  The Committee also recommended 
enhanced scrutiny for a small number of top-tier posts, and sought to stratify 
between different types of appointments.  For the very top-tier appointments, it 
recommended that Parliament was afforded a veto over appointment and dismissal; 
for the second tier, that a minister would appear before a committee if they decided 
to proceed against its recommendation; and, for a third tier, the continuation of the 
right to choose to hold pre-appointment hearings (HC 1230, 2011, para. 40).  The 
proposed tripartite system was therefore an attempt to clarify and streamline the ad 
hoc V\VWHPWKDWKDGHPHUJHGZKLOVW VLPXOWDQHRXVO\ LQFUHDVLQJ WKH+RXVH¶VSRZHUV
over a broader range of appointments.  Such demands have been echoed elsewhere.  
In June 2012, the Home Affairs Committee demanded information about 
unsuccessful candidates and interview performances so that they did not have to 
DVVHVVWKHVXLWDELOLW\RIWKHQRPLQDWHGFDQGLGDWHLQµDYDFXXP¶+&-I, 2012, para. 
DQGLQ-XO\WKH3$6&SXEOLVKHGDµFDOOIRUHYLGHQFH¶WRVROLFLWTXHVWLRQVIUom 
the public that could be addressed to the candidate for the Chair of the Committee on 
Standards in Public Life at their pre-appointment hearing.   
 
 
,Q -XQH  WKH *RYHUQPHQW UHMHFWHG WKH /LDLVRQ &RPPLWWHH¶V UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV
RXWULJKW  ,W VWDWHG WKDW µ[t]hese are ministerial appointments and it would not be 
DSSURSULDWHIRUSDUOLDPHQWWREHDQHTXDOSDUWQHULQDSSRLQWPHQWGHFLVLRQV¶+&
ZKLOVWUHPLQGLQJWKH&RPPLWWHHWKDWµ[i]n the majority of cases, we would 
expect that the select commitWHHZLOODJUHHZLWKWKHDSSRLQWPHQWRIWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶V
preferred candidate where an open and transparent process has been followed, the 
candidate has been selected on meritDQGWKHUHOHYDQWFRPPLWWHHKDVEHHQHQJDJHG¶
(HC 912, 2012, p. 3, emphasis added).  7KH *RYHUQPHQW¶V UHVSRQVH ZDV PHW ZLWK
IUXVWUDWLRQDVWKH/LDLVRQ&RPPLWWHHVWDWHGWKDW µ>Z@KLOHZHGHSORUHGWKHGHOD\ZH
KRSHG WKDWDW OHDVW LWZRXOGPHDQ WKDW WKH*RYHUQPHQW¶V UHVSRQVHZRXOGKDYHUHDO
substance, and take us forward to a new stage in the accountability of ministerial 
appointments. [T]he response fails to engage with our recommendations, and is 
VRPHZKDWGLVPLVVLYHLQWRQH¶+&SDUDV-7).   Yet by November 2013, it 
appeared that the Government was prepared to concede further ground to select 
committees, and revised Cabinet Office guidance (2013) included provisions for the 
sharing of information at all stages of the appointments process, including the job 
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specification and a summary of the overall field of applications.  Moreover, in the 
event of disagreement between a minister and select committee, whereas previous 
JXLGDQFH VLPSO\ UHTXLUHG WKH PLQLVWHU WR µFRQVLGHU DQ\ UHOHYDQW FRQVLGHUDWLRQV
FRQWDLQHG LQ WKH UHSRUW¶ DQG µIRUPDOO\ QRWLI\ WKH &RPPLWWHH &KDLU RI WKH GHFLVLRQ¶
(Cabinet Office, 2009, pp. 6-7), the revised guidance also required ministers to 
µUHVSRQGWRWKH&RPPLWWHHH[SODLQLQJWKHUHDVRQVZK\¶WKHUHSRUWµLVQRWDFFHSWHG¶
&UXFLDOO\ KRZHYHU WKH JXLGDQFH UHLWHUDWHG WKH SULQFLSOH WKDW µLW LV IRU 0LQLVWHUV WR
dHFLGH ZKHWKHU RU QRW WR DFFHSW D FRPPLWWHH¶V UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV¶ &DELQHW 2IILFH
2013, p. 4-5).  Nonetheless, as the research presented in the next section illustrates, 
VHOHFWFRPPLWWHHVKDYHEHHQHQJDJHGLQDSURFHVVRIµVFUXWLQ\FUHHS¶H[FHHGLQJWKHLU
stated competencies; and that this in turn has resulted in unintended consequences. 
 
 
3. Disordered drift and unintended consequences 
 
In setting out the evolution of pre-appointment scrutiny, the previous section 
captured the twin dynamics of legislative recalcitrance and executive acquiescence.  
It also revealed the way in which these competing tensions resulted in a somewhat 
piecemeal and disordered creation of competencies, as reforms were often the 
product of bilateral ad hoc agreements between specific departmental ministers and 
their respective select committees, and imposed upon an already congested 
institutional landscape.   Nonetheless, when the reforms are taken together, it is 
SRVVLEOH WR LGHQWLI\ WKH HPHUJHQFH RI D  µODGGHU RI SUH-DSSRLQWPHQW VFUXWLQ\¶
whereby a wider range of appointments have been subject to further forms of 
oversight (table 1, below).  All rungs of this ladder rest the principle that pre-
DSSRLQWPHQW VFUXWLQ\ VKRXOG WHVW DQ DSSRLQWHH¶V FRPSHWHQFH DQG H[SHUWLVH UDWKHU
WKDQFKDOOHQJHDPLQLVWHU¶VGHFLVLRQDQGWKDWDQ\QHJDWLYHUHSRUWRUYHWRVKRXOGEH
based on such considerations.  However, as this section will demonstrate, since 
2009 pre-appointment scrutiny has deviated from this narrow remit as select 
committees have become increasingly willing to publicly challenge the appointment 
RI WKH *RYHUQPHQW¶V SUHIHUUHG FDQGLGDWH activism).  This has resulted in further 
unintended consequences, as select committees have failed to focus solely on 
independence and professional competence and have instead engaged in political 
point-scoring (aggression).  In turn, the highly public and increasingly partisan 
nature of pre-appointment scrutiny (re-politicisation) has served to discourage 
involvement in public life, and risks negatively impacting on attempts to improve the 
diversity of public appointments (deterrence). This has therefore promoted critical 
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questions regarding the desireability of an extra layer of inherently political scrutiny 
within an otherwise independently regulated process (added-value).  
 
 
>>>  INSERT HERE <<< 
Table 1: The ladder of pre-appointment scrutiny 
 
 
 Activism 
 
At the time of writing, a total of 75 pre-appointment hearings with 81 candidates 
(including two re-appointments to the Office of Budgetary Responsibility) have been 
KHOG  8QWLO  VHOHFW FRPPLWWHHV HQGRUVHG JRYHUQPHQWV¶ SUHIHUUHG FDQGLGDWHV
without exception.  Yet in October 2009, the Children, Schools and Families 
&RPPLWWHH XQDQLPRXVO\ UHMHFWHG WKH6HFUHWDU\ RI 6WDWH¶V SUHIHUUHG QRPLQDWLRQ IRU
WKH SRVLWLRQ RI &KLOGUHQ¶V &RPPLVVLRQHU DQG since October 2009, a total of 13 
candidates have divided committees or been rejected outright, which represents 22 
percent of the 59 hearings held.  As discussed in more detail below, many of these 
divisions and rejections have witnessed committees split along party lines.  The 
rejection of Dominic Dodd as Chair of Monitor was a vivid illustration of this, and 
the formal minutes of evidence reveal that the four Labour MPs who ultimately 
WKZDUWHG 0U 'RGG¶V DSSRLQWPHQW WKH FDQGLGDWH VXEVHTXHQWO\ ZLWKGUHZ IROORZLQJ
the publication of a negative report) actively pursued a line of questioning that 
challenJHG WKH LGHRORJLFDO IRXQGDWLRQV RI WKH &RDOLWLRQ *RYHUQPHQW¶V KHDOWKFDUH
reforms.  Yet, as table 2 also illustrates, three out of the four rejections have 
ZLWQHVVHG JRYHUQPHQWV¶ RZQ EDFNEHQFK 03V DWWHPSW WR EORFN WKHLU PLQLVWHUV¶
appointments.  Regarding tKH UHMHFWLRQ RI 'U 0DJJLH $WNLQVRQ DV &KLOGUHQ¶V
Commissioner, for example, interviewees from a range of political parties and 
professional backgrounds concurred that she had become an unfortunate pawn in a 
much broader intra-party conflict.  The Committee¶V &KDLU %DUU\ 6KHHUPDQ
(Labour), was a long-time critic of the Prime Minister, Gordon Brown (the Secretary 
RI6WDWHIRU(GXFDWLRQ¶VSROLWLFDOSDWURQDQGZDVWKHUHIRUHDFFXVHGRIFR-opting the 
pre-appointment hearing to attack the Labour leadership.  Similarly, the unanimous 
decision of the Justice Committee to reject Diana Fulbrook as the Chief Inspector of 
Probation in May 2011 saw three Conservative MPs challenge the decision of then 
Secretary of State for Justice Ken Clarke, the most experienced Conservative 
PLQLVWHURIWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VIURQWEHQFK 
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Whilst the rate of rejection constitutes a small proportion of all select committee 
recommendations, it is clear that 2009 onwards constitutes a significantly more 
assertive phase of select committee activity, who ± as successive governments have 
reiterated ± DUHQRWH[SHFWHGWRFKDOOHQJHDPLQLVWHU¶VGHFLVLRQ0RUHRYHULWLVDOVR
clear that this activity has at various points been both partisan and institutional in 
nature, with select committee members from all parties attempting to block 
appointments.  The stark contrast between the expectations of government and the 
subsequent actions of select committees has also created a disjuncture between 
DSSOLFDQWV¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHUDWLRQDOHDQGIRUPDWRIpre-appointment hearings 
and the way in which hearings subsequently proceeded.  Cabinet Office guidance 
simply states that the purpose of hearings is to enable committees to take evidence 
IURP WKH *RYHUQPHQW¶V SUHIHUUHG FDQGLGDWH DQG WKDW DSSOLFDQWV IRU Sosts suitable 
for hearings must be made aware prior to applying.  One candidate stated that µfrom 
the head-hunters right the way through... it was made clear to candidates that the 
select committee did not have a right to veto. It was a confirmatory hearing for the 
VHFUHWDU\ RI VWDWH¶V SUHIHUUHG FDQGLGDWH¶ LQWHUYLHZ  $XJXVW  DQG DQRWKHU
described KRZ WKH KHDULQJV KDG EHHQ SRUWUD\HG DV D µbit of a rubber-stamping 
EHFDXVH>LQ@ WKHPDLQ LQWHUYLHZ>WKH\@KDGVDLG WKDW WKH\ZHUHUHFRPPHQGLQJPH¶
(interview, 9 September 2013).  This misunderstanding has also engendered 
indignation on the part of parliamentarians.  Reflecting on Professor Malcolm 
*UDQW¶V DSSHDUDQFH EHIRUH WKH +HDOWK &RPPLWWHH IRU H[DPSOH those members of 
the select committee who refused to endorse his appointment complained that the 
candidate µGHPRQVWUDWHG DQ DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW KLV DSSRLQWPHQW ZDV DOUHDG\
FRQILUPHG¶&DONLQDQG*ROding, 2011).   
 
>>>  INSERT HERE <<< 
Table 2: Pre-appointment rejections and divisions 
 
 Aggression  
 
Focusing on the rate of rejection alone therefore fails to adequately capture the 
political dynamics at play, and the broader ramifications of introducing a new form 
of legislative oversight within a highly adversarial polity.  As one MP noted, µ>W@KHUH¶V
no doubt that pre-appointment hearings seem to have changed.  It seems to reflect a 
sense of frustration on the part of select committees that they feel they should have 
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PRUHSRZHUEXWWKDWLVMXVWFRPLQJDFURVVDV«ZHOOUXGHQHVVUHDOO\¶LQWHUYLHZ
June 2013).  Whilst Cabinet Office guidance stated that questioning should remain 
IRFXVHG RQ µWKH SURIHVVLRQDO FRPSHWHQFH DQG SHUVRQDO LQGHSHQGHQFH RI WKH
cDQGLGDWH¶ &DELQHW2IILFHSDGHWDLOHGDQDO\VLVRIPLQXWHVRIHYLGHQFH
indicates a qualitative shift in the tone and nature of hearings, which are replete with 
examples of committees engaging in inappropriate, even aggressive, cross-
examination.  The PASC, for example, subjected Sir William Shawcross to questions 
that bore little relevance to the public appointment in question, including his views 
on the war in Iraq (HC 351-II, 2012, Q. 189).  Moreover, this hearing degenerated 
into an embarrassing and highly political exchange, with members of the committee 
arguing with the Chair: µ,DPVRUU\ZHGLGQRWKDYHDSUH-appointment hearing for 
\RX¶RQHPHPEHUWROGWKH&KDLUµ:HZRXOGQRWKDYHFKRVHQ\RX¶(HC 351-II, 2012, 
Q. 189).  Similarly, the Treasury Select Committee, widely regarded as an exemplar 
of best practice, has become more personal and aggressive in its post-appointment 
hearings.  The comment by one MP, for example, that KHIRXQG'DPH&ODUD)XUVH¶V
performance in front of the Committee µDPD]LQJO\XQLPSUHVVLYH¶ +&-I, 2013, 
Q. 34) was covered in both the national and international media. 
 
 (Re-)politicisation 
 
Reflecting on this increased assertiveness, many interviewees expressed serious 
concerns about the politicised nature of hearings.  One appointee described hearings 
DV OLWWOHPRUH WKDQ µan opportunity for them to gallop their political steeds around 
WKH URRP¶ LQWHUYLHZ  $XJXVW  DQG D FRPPLWWHH FOHUN QRWHG µVHYHUDO
committees seem to have forgotten the unwritten rule about good manners and a 
QDUURZ IRFXV¶ LQWHUYLHZ  -XQH   The rejection of Dr Maggie Atkinson as 
&KLOGUHQ¶V &RPPLVVLRQHU LQ  ZDV FLWHG E\ PDQ\ LQWHUYLHZHHV DV D FULWLFDO
example of the way in which good manners have been set aside in favour of political 
game-SOD\LQJµ0DJJLH$WNLQVRQJRWFDXJKWXSLQDEDWWOH«WKDWKDGYHU\OLWWOHWRGR
ZLWKKHU&9RUSHUIRUPDQFH¶RQH03QRWHG(interview, 18 October 2012).  Indeed, as 
table 2 above suggests, appointments in the fields of health and education have 
attracted the greatest degree of political controversy, prompting parliamentarians to 
GLYLGH DORQJ WUDGLWLRQDO SDUW\ OLQHV  7KH 6HFUHWDU\ RI 6WDWH IRU +HDOWK¶V SUHIHUUHG
candidate as Chair of the NHS Commissioning Board, Sir Malcolm Grant, was asked 
by RQH /DERXU PHPEHU µRWKHU WKDQ EHLQJ PDUULHG WR D *3 DQG KDYLQJ D PHGLFDO
school, what have you done that involves you in any way that demonstrates your 
SDVVLRQDERXWWKH1+6"¶EHIRUHWKHPHPEHULQWLPDWHGWKDWKLVQRPLQDWLRQDUHVXOW
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of favour by health ministers (HC 1562-ii, 2011).  Similarly, Dominic Dodd, the 
6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWH¶VSUHIHUUHGFDQGLGDWHDV&KDLURI0RQLWRUWKHUHJXODWRUIRUKHDOWK
services in England) was subject to sustained questioning (again, by a Labour 
member of the Committee) regarding his views on private healthcare and criticised 
for holding a senior position in Marakon Associates ± a private sector consultancy 
firm with interests in private healthcare ± despite the fact Mr Dodd left the company 
over a decade prior (HC 744, 2013, Qs 10-17). 
 
 Deterrence 
 
Immediately after their introduction on a pilot basis, then Commissioner for Public 
Appointments, Janet Gaymer, counselled against the formal adoption of pre-
appointment hearings on the basis that they would politicise the appointments 
process, and render well-qualified individuals reluctant to apply (HC 152, 2008).  
Such warnings were reiterated by interviewees.  One appointee stated that µif 
[hearings are] used as a political battleground then good people will not come 
IRUZDUGWRWDNHWKHVHMREV¶LQWHUYLew, 6 September 2013); and another declared that 
µ,GRNQRZRISHRSOHZKRKDYHZLWKGUDZQIURPVXFKUROHVEHFDXVHWKH\GLGQ¶WHQMR\
EHLQJXVHGDVDSROLWLFDOIRRWEDOO¶LQWHUYLHZ6HSWHPEHUSimilar concerns 
were publicly expressed when the Secretary of State for Justice, Ken Clarke, quietly 
withdrew his support for Diana Fulbrook after a negative report from the Justice 
Committee; a move that was considered by The Times (30/08/11) as almost 
JXDUDQWHHG WR µGHWHU SRWHQWLDO DSSOLFDQWV IURP ZLWKLQ WKH [probation] service 
DSSO\LQJIRUWKHMRE¶5HIOHFWLQJRQWKHLQFUHDVLQJO\SDUWLVDQDQGDGYHUVDULDOQDWXUH
RI KHDULQJV RQH VHQLRU FLYLO VHUYDQW VXJJHVWHG WKDW WKH\ ZRXOG EH µLQFUHGLEO\
GDXQWLQJ¶WRVRPHRQHµZKRLVQRWSDUWRIWKDWZRUOG¶(interview, 10 April 2013); and 
one MP noted that: 
 
What we seem to be doing is creating a new form of patronage that is even 
more exclusive than the old forms because you have to be able and willing 
to survive a select committee hearing that is increasingly adversarial. That 
might be fine if you are schooled in Westminster survival strategies and 
have the skin of a rhino but this serves to narrow the pool of candidates 
(interview, 23 October 2012).   
 
Evidence suggests that such a deterrent effect has begun to emerge.  One select 
committee member confided that the withdrawal of Dame Janet Finch as preferred 
candidate for the Chair of the Statistics Authority was a direct result of the hostile 
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line of questioning that she endured regarding her personal credibility, wherein the 
&KDLURI3$6&ZHQWVRIDUDVWRDVN µ,KDYHWRDVN\RXWKHDEVROXWHVKRFNHURIWKH
question, which is that, if this Committee were to recommend against your 
DSSRLQWPHQWLWLVLQIDFWVWLOOWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VSUHURJDWLYHWRDSSRLQW\RXDQ\ZD\
Would \RX DFFHSW WKH DSSRLQWPHQW RQ WKDW EDVLV"¶ +& -i, 2011, Q. 129).   
Similarly, a Freedom of Information request submitted to the Department of Health 
FRQILUPHGWKDW'RPLQLF'RGG µIormally withdrew his interest in the post [Chair of 
Monitor] following the decision of the Select Committee not to endorse his 
DSSRLQWPHQW¶,WLVFOHDUWKHUHIRUHWKDWSUH-appointment scrutiny has resulted in an 
anticipatory effect, as in both instances each candidate withdrew before the 
sponsoring minister publicly respondHGWRWKHFRPPLWWHH¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQ 
 
 
5HIOHFWLQJRQVXFKULVNVDIRUPHUVHOHFWFRPPLWWHHFKDLUZRQGHUHGLIµZHZHUHQ¶WLQ
GDQJHU RI FUHDWLQJ DQRWKHU ROG ER\V QHWZRUN¶ ZKLFK DOVR UHYHDOV WKH HIIHFW SUH-
appointment scrutiny on the diversity of public life.  One private recruitment 
specialist revealed that: 
 
Finding good people to apply for these posts was hard enough already, 
particularly when trying to find candidates from under-represented social 
JURXSV«1RZZHKDYH WKLVQHZVWDJHDQG LWVKLJK-risk, high-politics and 
KDUGWRSUHGLFWDQGSHRSOHGRQ¶WOLNHWKDW(interview, 20 May 2013).   
 
Indeed, several interviewees suggested that increasingly aggressive hearings had led 
WRDJHQGHUELDVµFDQLWEHDFRLQFLGHQFHWKDWZRPHQPDNHXSWKHPLQRULW\RIVHQior 
SXEOLF DSSRLQWPHQWV EXW WKUHH RI WKH IRXU UHMHFWLRQV E\ VHOHFW FRPPLWWHHV"¶
(interview with MP, 11 September 2013).  Evidence paints a mixed picture.  Under 
the Coalition, the proportion of women being newly appointed to public bodies has 
risen from 36.4% in 2010 to 41.1% in 2014 (OCPA, 2014, p. 8).  Yet previous research 
(Flinders, Matthews and Eason, 2012) has underlined a range of constraints on, and 
barriers to, greater diversity in public life, specifically the way in which the at times 
tribal culture of Westminster politics can be daunting to those not imbued with such 
QRUPV  ,QGHHG 2&3$¶V ODWHVW VWDWLVWLFV UHYHDOV WKDW LQ UHODWLRQ WR WKH PRVW VHQLRU
chair appointments (i.e. those exact appointments liable to pre-appointment 
scrutiny), only 20% of applications received are from women; and only 24% of 
appointees are women (OCPA, 2013, p. 21; OCPA, 2014, p. 8).  Such incidents 
therefore carry the potential to undermine the fragile progress made in recent years 
in terms of improving the diversity of life; and the loss of so many high-profile 
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IHPDOH DSSRLQWHHV ZLOO DIIHFW SURJUHVV DJDLQVW WKH &RDOLWLRQ¶V RZQ DVSLUDWLRQ RI
opening-up public life to previously under-represented groups.  
 
 Added-value 
 
Taken together, the four pressures set out above flow into a wider issue regarding 
WKH µDGGHG-YDOXH¶ RI SUH-appointment scrutiny.  The independent system of 
regulation, overseen by OCPA, had already generated complaints about inflexibility 
and complexity, which led to its fundamental review in 2012.  Yet the relationship 
between the systems of regulation and scrutiny ± one independent, one legislative ± 
has drifted without explicit consideration of the inter-relationships or interface 
between these two systems. This might reflect the fact, as one senior Cabinet Office 
RIILFLDO SXW LW WKDW µ>W@KH 3ULPH 0LQLVWHUV¶ >*RUGRQ %URZQ¶V@ DQQRXQFHPHQW LQ WKH
+RXVH ZDV WKH ILUVW ZH¶G KHDUG RI WKH SODQ« LW DOO FDPH DV D FRPSOHWH VKRFN¶
(interview, 20 February 2012).  The addition of a highly politicised final stage of pre-
appointment scrutiny to an otherwise independently regulated public appointment 
process is therefore anomalous.  Moreover, several interviewees expressed 
important concerns regarding the lack of expertise on the part of parliamentarians 
to assess the prRIHVVLRQDO FRPSHWHQFH RI FDQGLGDWHV  2QH DSSRLQWHH DVNHG µ>W@KH\
are not trained in employment process, they do not have the right to hire you or fire 
you and therefore why would they have the right of veto? (29 August 2013); and 
another stated that: 
 
WhaWZRUULHVPHLVWKDWLWZDVVRDPDWHXULVKO\GRQH«2QHRIWKHWKLQJV
that really stood out was how ill-prepared they were, how little they knew 
about me, how little they knew about the appointments process. One 
wondered if they had been briefed at all (interview, 13 September 2013).   
 
,QGHHGRQHDSSRLQWHHKLJKOLJKWHGWKHµPLVPDWFK¶EHWZHHQDWUDQVSDUHQWDQGPHULW-
based public appointments process and the existence of a final layer of pre-
DSSRLQWPHQW VFUXWLQ\ DVNLQJ µ$W WKDWSRLQW \RX KDYH WR VD\ MXVW ZKDW LV WKH UROH"¶
(interview, 17 September 2013).  7KLVVHQVHRI µPLVPDWFK¶XQGRXEWHGO\VWHPVIURP
tensions between government and Parliament, and the competing dynamics that 
have shaped the scrutiny of executive patronage; and again underlines the challenge 
of inculcating a merit-focused model of pre-appointment scrutiny within a power-
hoarding majoritarian democracy.    
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4. Concluding remarks and comparative relevance 
 
 
At first glance, the incentives for members of the House to engage in the scrutiny of 
public appointments may appear unclear, not least because the vast majority of 
KHDULQJVVXSSRUWHGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VFDQGLGDWHDQGRQO\RQFH LQ WKHFDVHRI'LDQD
Fulbrook, has the minister publicly withdrawn support following a negative 
committee report.  Indeed, in relation to the overwhelming majority of appointments, 
select committees have not been granted formal veto powers and pre-appointment 
hearings are not intended to replicate US-style confirmation hearings.  However, this 
simplistic interpretation neglects the deeper but less visible impact of these reforms.  
$V RQH IRUPHU VHQLRU FLYLO VHUYDQW QRWHG µ, NQRZ WKH\¶UH QRW IRUPDOO\ FRQILUPDWRU\
KHDULQJVEXW LQ IDFW LIDFRPPLWWHHVD\V WKH\¶UHQRW LQ IDYRXURIDSHUVRQ WKHQWKDW
ZRXOG EH WKH HQG¶  7his argument was widespread amongst interviewees who 
generally felt that select committees had become de facto veto players due to the 
impact a negative report would have on the credibility of the appointee and the 
appointing minister, which was played out in relation to the appointments of Dame 
Janet Finch and Dominic Dodd.  µ,W ZRXOG EH ULGLFXORXV¶ DV RQH IRUPHU 0LQLVWHU
QRWHG µIRU DQ\RQH WR ZDQW WR WU\ DQG JHW VRPHRQH WKURXJK ZKR ZDV QRW KHDG DQG
VKRXOGHUVDERYHWKHEDU¶The introduction of pre-appointment hearings has therefore 
brought with it a strong anticipatory effect or preventative influence that permeates 
the whole appointments process.   Pre-appointment scrutiny therefore constitutes a 
VLOHQW UHYROXWLRQ DV WKH µHIILFLHQW VHFUHW¶ RI H[HFXWLYH-legislature relations (i.e. the 
convention of individual ministerial responsibility) has been broken, whilst attracting 
little academic or public comment.  Yet it is clear that the House of Commons is being 
drawn into the business of governing, rather than just scrutiny, evolving rapidly from 
a reactive to proactive legislature in relation to executive patronage.  Such 
developments are therefore difficult to reconcile with the British political tradition, 
DQG WKH 8. FDQ EH FKDUDFWHULVHG DV µ:DVKPLQVWHU¶ K\brid, existing somewhere 
between presidentialism and parliamentarianism.   
 
 
This momentum shows little sign of slowing, and developments in the UK are 
therefore of comparative significance, as no other parliamentary democracy has 
evolved so far towards a FRQJUHVVLRQDOPRGHORI µDGYLFHDQGFRQVHQW¶ 0RUHRYHU LWV
findings chime with longstanding debates about the legislative oversight of political 
patronage in the context of presidentialism detailed above; and it is therefore clear 
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that dilemmas regarding the appropriate trade-off between legislative scrutiny and 
executive patronage are highly contested in parliamentary and presidential systems 
alike.  Indeed, the greatest significance of the UK case is the way in which recent 
reforms have blurred the traditional distinction between parliamentarianism and 
SUHVLGHQWLDOLVPRUDWWKHYHU\OHDVWEHWZHHQWKH86µYHWRVW\OH¶DQG8.µVFUXWLQ\VW\OH¶
models of legislative oversight.  Pre-appointment scrutiny in the UK was never 
LQWHQGHGWRUHSOLFDWHWKH86µYHWRVW\OH¶PRGHO\HWWKHZD\LQZKLFKWKHV\VWHPKDV
been allowed to drift runs counter to these intentions.   These developments also run 
FRXQWHUWRWKHµPLUURULQJSULQFLSOH¶ZKLFKSUHGLFWVWKDWµZLWKLQDJLYHQOHJLVODWXUHWKH
distribution of legislative influence tends to mirror the external checks and balances 
LQ WKH SROLW\ DV D ZKROH¶ 0F&XEELQV    The introduction of legislative 
powers such as double-locking have increased the number of veto points and in turn 
risked the gridlock and inertia more typically associated with presidential systems.  
Whilst at present no other parliamentary system has introduced such powers (the 
Procedural Affairs Committee in Ontario, for example, rejected a US-style legislative 
veto as incompatible with cabinet government), it is crucial that such risks are 
recognised.   
 
 
7KLVSRLQWEULQJVWKLVDUWLFOHEDFNWRWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQµSDWURQDJHDVFRUUXSWLRQ¶
DQGµSDWURQDJHDVJRYHUQDQFH¶DQGWRDUJXPHQWVFRQFHUQLQJWKHXVHRISDWURQDJHDV
a critical way of forming low-cost, high-trust relationships between politicians and 
officials in a context of an increasingly complex and fragmented institutional 
architecture.  Calls to further restrict executive patronage, for example by removing 
entirely the power of selectiRQ IURP PLQLVWHU¶V KDQGV DV DGYRFDWHG LQ &DQDGD E\
Aucoin and Goodyear-Grant, 2002) arguably fail to appreciate not only the potential 
that patronage provides in terms of executive control, but the way in which a direct 
relationship between minister and appointee prevents blame-shifting.  Put slightly 
differently, removing ministers from the appointments process risks them being 
accountable for individuals they had no role in appointing ± H[DFWO\WKHVRUWRIµODPH
GXFN¶DSSRLQWHHVWKDWWKH8.JRYHUQPHQWFDutioned against in its attempts to resist 
pre-appointment scrutiny.  Yet, as this article has clearly demonstrated, such risks 
have begun to emerge in the UK as the increasingly partisan and combative nature of 
pre-appointment hearings has prompted the withdrawal of candidates from the 
appointments process.  This raises fresh questions about how to balance the 
centripetal thrust of delegation with the centrifugal logic of political accountability. 
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1: The ladder of pre-appointment scrutiny  
Stage Standard of 
control 
Procedure Examples Date 
introduced 
6 µ'RXEOH-ORFNLQJ¶ Statutory right of veto Office for Budget 
Responsibility 
February 2011 
5 Very high Non-statutory right of veto Information Commissioner 
 
February 2011 
4 High Formalised pre-
appointment hearings and 
affirmative legislative vote 
Chairs of Electoral 
Commission, Statistics Board, 
Independent Parliamentary 
Standards Authority 
July 2007 
3 Medium/ 
high 
Formalised pre-
appointment hearings 
Chairs of Natural England, 
Office of Rail Regulation, Care 
Quality Commission 
July 2007 
2 Medium/ 
low 
Formalised post-
appointment hearings 
Members of the MPC 2007 
onwards, Chair of the 
Financial Services Authority 
July 2007 
1 Low Non-statutory confirmation 
hearings 
Members of the MPC, 1998-
2007, all ministerial 
appointments not covered by 
Cabinet Office guidance 
June 1998 
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Table 2: Pre-appointment rejections and divisions 
 
 
Date Post Appointee Committee Outcome Consensus Ayes Noes 
 
12 Oct 2009 &KLOGUHQ¶V&RPPLVVLRQHUIRU
England 
Dr Maggie Atkinson Children, Schools 
and Families 
Rejected 8-0 Con ± 3 
Lab ± 3 
Lib Dem - 2 
 
12 Oct 2009 Local Government Ombudsman  Dr Jane Martin Communities and 
Local 
Government 
Recommended 2-1 Lab ± 2 Con - 1 
16 Nov 2010 First Civil Service Commissioner 
and Commissioner for Public 
Appointments 
Sir David Normington PASC Recommended 
 
2-1 Con ± 1  
Lib Dem ± 1 
 
Lab - 1 
11 May 2011 HM Chief Inspector of Probation Diana Fulbrook 
 
Justice Rejected 7-0 Lab ± 4 
Con ± 3 
 
28 Jun 2011 Chair of UK Statistics Authority Dame Janet Finch 
 
PASC Withdrew before report published 
18 Oct 2011 Chair of the NHS Commissioning 
Board 
Professor Malcolm 
Grant 
Health Recommended 4-3 Con -3  
Lib Dem - 1 
Lab - 3 
2 Feb 2012 Director of the Office of Fair 
Access 
 
Professor Leslie 
Ebdon 
Business, 
Innovation and 
Skills 
Rejected 4-2 Con - 4 Lab - 2 
23 Jun 2012 +HU0DMHVW\¶V&KLHI,QVSHFWRURI
Constabulary 
Tom Winsor Home Affairs Recommended 7-1 Con ± 5 
Lib Dem - 1 
Lab - 1 
5 Sep 2012 Chair of the Charity Commission 
 
William Shawcross 
CVO 
PASC Recommended 4-3 Con ± 4 Lab - 2 
Lib Dem - 1 
9 Sep 2013 Chair of OFGEM 
 
David M. Gray Energy and 
Climate Change 
Recommended 5-1 Con ± 2 
Lab - 3 
Lab - 1 
15 Oct 2013 Chair of Monitor Dominic Dodd Health Rejected 3-2 Lab ± 3 Con ± 1 
Lib Dem ± 1 
17 Dec 2013 Chair of OFCOM Dame Patricia 
Hodgson 
Culture, Media 
and Sport 
Recommended 7-1 Con ± 3 
Lab ± 4 
Con ± 1 
15 Sep 2014 Registrar of Consultant Lobbyists Alison White Political and 
Constitutional 
Reform 
Recommended 4-3 Con ± 1 
Lab ± 2 
Lib Dem ± 1 
Con ± 1 
Lab ± 2 
